Now that much of the dust has settled down in both India and Pakistan, after the joint press conference in Islamabad on July 15th, it is now time to introspect on two key responses of Foreign Minister Qureshi, which has caused much discomfort to us.
These were :
a) Attack on our Home Secretary
While countering the reservations expressed by our Foreign Minister Mr. S.M. Krishna regarding the objectionable utterances made by Hafiz Sayeed against India, Foreign Minister Qureshi said “ When you point out to Sayeed’s speech or speeches , let me draw your attention to the Indian Home Secretary’s statement which has been widely reported in the newspapers today. Tell me, to what extent did it help? We were of the opinion that it was uncalled for.”
The words “tell me to what extent did it help?” in this retaliation by Mr. Qureshi, clearly highlights the fact that Mr. Pillai’s statement, on the eve of these talks, highlighting the role of ISI in the Mumbai attacks as revealed by David Headley, did not help in creating a conducive climate for such talks.
We seem to have gone overboard in jumping to the conclusion that Mr. Qureshi had “dared” to equate someone like Hafiz Sayeed who holds no official position in the Pakistani Government with someone of the status of our Home Secretary.
Now, where was the need for Mr. Pillai to make such comments in the first place ? How could he overlook the fact that David Headley’s confessions were already part of the dossier shared by Mr. Chidambaram with his counterpart Mr. Rehman Malik just a few weeks ago? Secondly, how could he not realize that by making such ill timed comments, even if these were factually correct, he would only be unnecessarily giving an additional ammunition to our hosts to launch a counter attack on us, which Mr. Qureshi did capitalize on quite well ?
While his counterpart was launching this counter attack on reference to Hafiz Sayeed, Mr. Krishna’s smile and his silence did not go unnoticed. Perhaps, he too could not disagree with his counterpart’s contention “Tell me, to what extent did it help?”. That he stood by Mr. Pillai subsequently post this press conference, was perhaps an after thought, and
b) On Infiltration
Responding to a question on infiltration, Mr. Qureshi responded by saying that it is not the stated policy of his government or any of its intelligence agencies to facilitate infiltration of terrorists across the LoC to India. Yet if at all any such kind of infiltration does take place, the Indian government should deal with it firmly.
Way back in the year 2001, an anchor of a leading television channel had posed a similar question to another Qureshi in Pakistan. This was Maj Gen Qureshi, who at that time was the Chief Spokesperson for President Musharraf. Gen Qureshi’s response was:
“Across the LoC (referring to our side) , there are three layers of security consisting of formations from the Army and paramiltary forces. Are you trying to say that these infiltrators are able to penetrate these three layers of security ?”
Certainly, our anchor had no response to it.
Now almost a decade later:
• Have things improved significantly where the menance of infiltration from Pakistan is concerned ?
• Have we been able to create a fool proof system across the LoC so as to eliminate any infiltrators without suffering casualties ?
• Have we been able to equip our security forces with the state of art equipments and weaponry to effectively foil such infiltration attempts ?
Surely enough, the response by our Defence Ministry and Home Ministry to the above are likely to disappoint us, despite the fact that it is now over two decades since this cross LoC/border infiltration began from Pakistan.
When we ourselves have been so frustratingly casual about tackling such menance, why do we expect any meaningful action from Pakistan, whenever we raise the issue of cross LoC infiltration with them ?
It is now high time to reflect upon our shortcomings as well, where our decision on engaging Pakistan is concerned. Post 26/11, when there was a real threat of a military action by us against the terror camps Pakistan, we raised our ante against them, but the tone was remarkably gentle as compared to our reaction post the attack on our Parliament. The world opinion was with us for obvious reasons.
Eight months down the line in July 2009, the joint statement at Sharm El Sheikh hit us beyond our imagination. That Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had to retract from this joint declaration after facing considerable flak at home is another matter.
Now, our stated position regarding the terms of engagement with Pakistan is that action on the perpetrators of 26/11, and the credible action on terrorism would precede other discussions. If that be so, then why not confine our engagement right now to the level of our Home Minister and his counterpart at the most ?
Let us wait till the Pakistanis show their sincerity in addressing an issue which apart from healing the wounds of 26/11, and also ensure no such acts are repeated ever again.
The problem perhaps lies with our mindset ever since 1947, that when it comes to Pakistan, we need to play the role of that proverbial “big brother” who has to be over generous to his younger sibling, never mind if he is being let down time and again. The history of Indo Pak engagements since 1947 till date, bear an eloquent testimony to the same.
That till now, this mindset has perhaps prevented us from stating our position in clear and unambiguous terms to Pakistan, has been brought out very clearly in 'The Times of India' dated 18th July, which said:
“ What Pakistan understood from resumption of dialogue and what India understood were very different, what Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao called a difference in perception.
