While observing the 50th anniversary of the 1965 war, which despite ending in stalemate, can be considered a victory by us, as we managed to thwart Pakistani designs of wresting Kashmir away from us, notwithstanding our severe limitations of having to spread our military resources to guard against the Chinese who had inflicted a humiliating defeat on us just three years ago.
Yet, it would be worth reflecting on the following:
a) What were the reasons for us being caught off guard by the Pakistanis this time, and that too just three years after the bitter experience with China?
b) What was the role played by the erstwhile Soviet Union and the US to end the war?
c) Haji Pir pass in Pakistan was captured by our soldiers after engaging with the enemy in a hand-to-hand combat, and according to one media report our Army Medical Corps posted close to the Haji Pir pas even ran out of the crucial morphine injections to give temporary relief from pain to our injured soldiers. But much despite the reservations expressed by our Army , our leadership returned the Pass to Pakistan at time of signing the Tashkent agreement.
What were the compelling circumstances behind overruling the reservations of our Army?
What were the compelling circumstances behind overruling the reservations of our Army?
d) The key objective behind Operation Gibralter and Grand Slam was to wrest Kashmir from us. Did the Tashkent Agreement settle this issue once for all, or was this crucial issue ignored as seem to be evident otherwise?
It was the second attempt by Pakistan to grab Kashmir by the use of force after the failed 1947-48 war. Tragically, we were condemned to suffer the this failed attempt by Pakistan,more than three decades later in Kargil.
It was the second attempt by Pakistan to grab Kashmir by the use of force after the failed 1947-48 war. Tragically, we were condemned to suffer the this failed attempt by Pakistan,more than three decades later in Kargil.
e) The Tashkent Agreement was brokered by the erstwhile Soviet Union and the US, and not by the United Nations, thereby making the role of the United Nations redundant in 1965 itself , where Kashmir was concerned. Then why do we not emphazise this point in our discussions with Pakistan? Above all, the Simla Agreement which was executed in 1972 makes a subtle reference to the LoC as the de facto international border with Pakistan,
f) And above all, the most notable defeat for Pakistan was its closest ally China keeping away from engaging us simultaneously, some thing that could have changed the outcome completely. Some credit does go to our covert diplomacy with China those days. Of course, this is an assumption.
